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There is a mass of research literature providing evidence for the ‘Weapon Focus’ effect which 
although traditionally accounted for in terms of an Arousal explanation, underpinned by 
Easterbrook’s (1959) Cue-Utilisation Hypothesis, recently research has favoured causation of 
such an effect in terms of a Salience explanation, understood in terms of Schematic memory 
structures. However, neither explanation as of yet has been able to conclusively disprove the 
other. In a study measuring the physiology and memory of participants, in conditions 
specifically designed to improve on past literatures methodological shortfalls, the effects of 
both explanations were meticulously separated out in an attempt to clearly investigate 
differences between them. Findings displayed that although differences emerged between 
memory scores and levels of physiological arousal between salience and arousal conditions, 
such were not to a significant extent. Methodological shortfalls within the current experiment 
and past research studies are thought to account for the failure to produce a weapons focus 
effect or further significant differences, however critical evaluation and deeper consideration 
of the current theoretical accounts identifies the inadequacy of these explanations, as well as 
future suggestions on how such might be improved. 
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Within the criminal justice system Eyewitness Testimony (EWT) plays a large and integral part in the 
identification and conviction of many offenders, which over time has often been suggested as exerting 
too powerful an influence upon court case verdicts (Gudjonsson, 1996). Throughout the United 
Kingdom and America the introduction of DNA in the 1990’s brought about proving many innocent 
people to have been wrongly convicted and imprisoned largely on the basis of inaccurate EWT (Wells 
et al, 1998). The Devlin Report conducted in the UK some years earlier provided evidence that such 
miscarriages of justice that led to wrongful convictions and incarceration of innocent suspects, were 
not simply isolated occurrences (Devlin, 1976). Similarly Scheck et al (2000) and Well’s et al (2006) 
independently examining sentencing exonerations in New York, found in over 75% of cases 
inaccurate EWT was the key component in wrongful convictions. Such research undoubtedly 
highlight the degree of credibility ascribed to EWT despite evidence demonstrating how seemingly 
vulnerable such memory of events may be. 
 
Research into the ‘Weapon Focus’ Effect 
Over time much research has been conducted examining a variety of perceptual and memory 
fallibilities associated with EWT, one area of which has acquired considerable attention is that known 
as the ‘Weapons focus’ effect (WFE).The WFE described by Wells and Olson (2003) as amongst the 
best known but least understood memory phenomenon’s, refers to a common adverse effect upon 
certain memories when a weapon is present in a crime scene. Loftus et al (1987:55) defined WFE as 
“the concentration of a witness’s attention on a weapon and the resultant reduction in ability to 
remember details of the crime thereafter”. Such an effect seemingly has great implications for 
criminal proceedings as it would suggest that in some of the most serious of crimes where weapons 
are present, EWT is potentially unreliable. This is a claim not lacking empirical support. 
In an early study by Johnson & Scott (1976), participants in field settings overheard either an 
innocuous or argumentative conversation, followed by observing an individual fleeing the scene 
whilst holding either a greased pen or blood stained knife. Findings displayed significantly greater 
recollection of the knife in comparison to the pen, alongside significantly decreased identification of 
the target individual. Despite some researchers contesting that the presence of blood and the argument 
itself may have confounded with the presence of a weapon (Shaw and Skolnick, 1994), subsequent 
research implementing greater methodological controls, obtained consistent findings. 
Loftus et al (1987) for example, studied participants eye fixations whilst observing video clip 
scenarios depicting an individual directing either a gun or cheque towards a restaurant cashier and 
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found that participants focused more frequently and for longer on the weapon object. Findings also 
displayed participants recalled significantly fewer correct details regarding the target individual in the 
weapon present condition than the non-weapon present condition, thereby suggesting the increase in 
attention paid to a weapon inhibited accurate memory of the perpetrator and other such peripheral 
details. Similarly Maass & Kohnken (1989) whom in response to criticism’s regarding the passive 
nature and inactive role of witnesses in the previous research designed a new experimental paradigm. 
Participants whilst secured into a chair were approached by an experimenter holding either a syringe 
or pen, thereby directly involved in the scenario and found that exposure to the syringe (weapon 
object) significantly decreased line-up recognition of the experimenter in comparison to that of the 
pen. In a meta-analysis of weapons focus research Steblay (1992) reported finding overall a reduction 
in the accuracy of line-up identifications and details recalled about the event and perpetrator when a 
weapon was present. This difference was only small but nonetheless significant. 
A small number of studies however, based upon real police witness data considered to be high in 
ecological validity in comparison to laboratory simulations, failed to obtain support of a WFE (e.g. 
Shaw and Skolnick, 1994; Wright and McDaid, 1996; Valentine et al, 2003). Having said this, Wells 
et al (2006) provided a plausible explanation of such findings suggesting that real crime data can be 
considered unavoidably entangled with confounding variables between crimes and therefore may have 
obscured the presence of a WFE. One such likely factor is the variation in the duration of time that 
‘Perpetrators’ were observed between crimes, which in itself has been shown to alter memory recall 
abilities (Bornstein et al, 1998).  
Overall though, consistent with findings from Kassin et al’s (2001) survey of Forensic psychology 
experts, whereby 87% stated the WFE was reliable enough for psychologists to testify about in court, 
97% of whom propose such an opinion to be grounded in reliable research findings, laboratory 
experiments and field study simulations have repeatedly demonstrated the deleterious effects that the 
presence of a weapon has upon witness memory (Maass and Kohnken, 1989; Kramer et al, 1990; 
Mitchell et al, 1998; Pickel, 1998,1999; Hope and Wright, 2007; Davies et al, 2008). Having said this, 
causes of the WFE are less clear and are accounted for predominantly in terms of two main 
explanations each of which opposes the other within the aforementioned research.  
 
Arousal Explanation of the ‘Weapon Focus’ effect 
One hypothesis put forward for such a narrowing of attention focus effect is the Arousal explanation. 
Understood in terms of Easterbrook’s (1959) Cue-Utilisation hypothesis, as an organism experiences 
heightened emotional arousal (i.e. in response to threatening or fearful stimuli such as a weapon), 
perceptual range is suggested to narrow and attention becomes focused upon the source of such 
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arousal (e.g. a weapon) whilst less arousing aspects or ‘cues’ in the context of the crime, either fail to 
be attended to or to a lesser extent (e.g. perpetrators description). As a result, the assumption is that 
central ‘cues’ are processed and well remembered but peripheral aspects fail to be encoded, 
consequently causing memory for such to be poor.  
Despite its intuitively appealing simplicity in regards to explaining causation of the WFE, an opinion 
seemingly shared by researchers in the field whom have largely adopted the explanation even with the 
availability of other Arousal perspectives, offering slightly alternative and arguably more detailed 
explanations (e.g. Deffenbacher et al, 1994; 2004), the arousal explanation in line with Easterbrook’s 
(1959) hypothesis fails to explicitly account for how such emotionally-arousing objects are thought to 
cause such a narrowing of attention focus. One seemingly likely explanation in line with evolutionary 
based ‘fight or flight’ responses is that, in fearful events weapons are focused upon in order to assess 
the best course of action required in order to survive, ultimately leading to greater processing and 
encoding of such details whilst less immediately informative aspects are neglected and therefore are 
unlikely to be recalled as well. Nonetheless, Easterbrook’s (1959) interpretation has been the most 
favoured explanation adopted by researchers in the field, a great deal of whom have claimed to have 
obtained supportive and corresponding findings of such.  
Maass and Kohnken’s (1989) study as was outlined above, found participants exposed to ‘threatening’ 
stimuli not only recalled significantly less details regarding the experimenter but provided 
significantly better recall of the weapon and experimenters hand with which it was held, when 
compared to non-threatening stimuli. Similarly Kramer et al (1990) upon exposing participants to 
video clips whereby the visibility of ‘threatening’ objects was manipulated between samples, found 
the greater the visibility of a weapons presence, the greater the level of reported arousal and the 
poorer the recall of witnessed events.  
More recently Davies et al (2008) studying the WFE upon children when exposed to an array of 
objects rated in terms of the nature of threat and unusualness they represented, found conditions 
containing an object deemed ‘threatening’, elicited significantly lower levels of accurate recall 
regarding the appearance of the experimenter, than control and unusual object conditions. 
Alternatively Hope and Wright (2007) had participants view a slideshow sequence of an event 
varying only in the objects held by a perpetrator between conditions, whilst attending to a secondary 
task. By categorising objects as representing either threat or unusualness as well as representing 
neither (e.g. Control object), the authors reported that although both threatening and unusual objects 
were found to command attention, the threat associated with the weapon ultimately resulted in poorer 
perpetrator recognition ability than the other non-threatening conditions. Although such findings 
seemingly provide support for the Arousal explanation, methodological shortfalls within the research 
literature may suggest findings should be interpreted with care.  
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Firstly, most if not all studies to date directly measuring the effect of a weapons presence upon 
memory, have failed to actually measure the physiological arousal levels of participants. Despite this, 
studies such as Kramer et al (1990) have nonetheless reported the presence of a weapon to have 
increased arousal on the basis of questionable measures, whereby participants simply reporting how 
‘Aroused’ they felt during exposure to stimuli in experimental conditions. As was noted by Coolican 
(2009) such self-rating scores rely upon subjective human judgements and therefore are unable to 
reliably ensure such ratings between participants equally represent the same extent of arousal 
experienced. An explanation for a lack of such measures within past research may be in part due to 
the lack of detailed explanation of exactly why such heightening of arousal is thought to cause a 
narrowing of perceptual focus as well as the suggestion that laboratory simulations are unlikely to 
produce the same increases in arousal as would be expected upon exposure to a real life crime (Loftus 
et al, 1987). Nonetheless, if only to the hypothesised lesser extent, it seems likely that measuring 
arousal may in some way aid the understanding of processors underlying of the arousal explanation. 
Secondly, much past research failed to conduct any initial corroboration that objects thought to be, 
‘fearful’ or ‘threatening’ were actually perceived as such by the experimental participants or any 
independent samples. Additionally, the few studies that did address this issue, did so poorly. Maass 
and Kohnken (1989) and Hope and Wright (2007) simply presumed weapon objects selected were 
perceptibly threatening and fearful failing to account for how salient weapons may be perceived as 
when unexpectedly observed in a given scenario. Similarly Davies et al (2008) assigned a syringe as 
representing arousing stimuli despite being only marginally perceived as the most threatening from an 
array of objects and more than a quarter of the preliminary sample rating such to be the most salient 
object within the array. The use of such poorly established and uncorroborated object representations 
may have great implications for the findings and conclusions drawn within past research. For example 
Steblay’s (1992) aforementioned Meta-analysis, along with other aforementioned research, all of 
which has reported greatest effect sizes to have been obtained when stimuli objects were deemed 
highly Arousing and threatening, may in fact be equally attributable, if not more indicative of an 
objects unusual, unexpected presence in the context in which they are observed. The concept of such 
is in fitting and in fact the basis of the opposing main explanation of the WFE namely, the Salience 
explanation. 
 
Salience Explanation of the ‘Weapon Focus’ effect  
Within the Salience explanation, ‘weapon focus’ is thought to occur as a result of certain objects 
whether a weapon or otherwise being perceived as unusual, novel or unexpected within a given 
context and thereby being inconsistent within past schematic memory structures. Moreover, it is 
proposed that when the presence of an object within particular context (e.g. a ‘Gun’ or ‘Chicken’ in 
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the bank), fails to conform with previous expectations held within such a context based upon past 
experiences of similar scenarios, such objects ‘capture’ attention focus in order to account for its 
presence.  As a result, attention capacity elsewhere narrows to the point that more congruent or 
expected aspects of a scene fail to be processed and encoded, reducing subsequent recall abilities for 
such information (Kramer et al, 1990; Pickel, 1998; Pickel, 2009). This more recent explanation for 
the WFE based upon object saliency, has yielded some seemingly strong contradictory findings.  
 
Pickel’s (1999) findings suggested accurate memory recall of an event involving the presence of a 
weapon was only impaired in settings whereby the presence of a weapon was deemed incongruent. 
Moreover, when a male in a video clip was observed approaching a female and obtaining money 
whilst in possession of a firearm, findings displayed in the context of a shooting range (where the 
presence of a gun was not considered unusual), participants provided more accurate descriptions of 
the male as opposed to when the same scenario was observed in the context of a baseball ground 
(where such an objects presence was considered unusual), whereby accurate descriptions were 
significantly poorer.  
 
In an earlier study, Pickel (1998) improving on poorly defined object representation’s identified in 
past research, showed participants a video clip scenario of a robbery in a hairdressing salon whereby a 
‘perpetrator’ was observed holding varying objects, rated beforehand in terms of perceived ‘threat’ 
and ‘unusualness’. Findings displayed, when the objects were highly unusual but low in threat within 
the given context (e.g. a whole raw chicken), witnesses recalled significantly less accurate 
descriptions regarding the perpetrator’s appearance, than objects rated more threatening but were 
congruent within the scenario (e.g. scissors). Correspondingly in a similar study independently 
conducted around the same time, Mitchell et al (1998) drew consistent findings, also concluding that 
object salience alone was sufficient in obtaining a WFE. Such findings led the researchers to suggest 
that contrary to the Arousal hypothesis, the WFE occurred not because of the threat or fear associated 
with a weapon, needing not even be a weapon object but from any unusual object in a context where 
its presence is considered unexpected.  
 
The Salience explanation gains further credibility when considering research investigating the role of 
cognition in visual processing. Loftus and Mackworth (1978), Henderson, et al (1999) and Gordon 
(2004) measuring eye fixations upon objects consistent or incongruent within varying contexts (e.g. 
octopus / tractor in a farm scene), obtained findings suggesting unexpected object’s in given 
situation’s achieved longer and more frequent eye fixations than more context consistent objects. The 
authors perceived such findings quite plausibly, as seeming to display a relationship between the 




Overall, despite the Salience explanation being a relatively recent hypothesis for the WFE and only 
limited numbers of research literature having been conducted on such principles, all findings obtained 
as of yet have been supportive of object unusualness and novelty causing such an effect. Such 
findings have led the Salience camp to propose that, although witnesses may indeed feel frightened in 
response to a weapons presence, in line with the arousal explanation, such increased anxiety or 
arousal levels are not thought to be an adequate enough factor to cause the WFE (Pickel et al, 2006). 
Although not detailing explicitly why such an effect is deemed an unlikely cause, the aforementioned 
findings by Pickel, (1998) and Mitchell et al, (1998) thought to provide support of such a claim, 
displaying that objects need not even be threatening (e.g. chicken, stethoscope), in order to produce a 
WFE. The ‘Weapon Focus’ effect is therefore suggested to be, too narrow an explanation of such an 
effect, instead thought to be better described as a more general, ‘attention focus’ effect.  
 
 
Current study Rationale 
Within past research certain methodological shortfalls have allowed for findings derived to be brought 
into question. Moreover, research conducted around the Arousal explanation has been shown for the 
most part to have failed to conduct any preliminary research to ensure stimuli objects accurately 
represented the arousal and salient conditions to which they were assigned. Similarly, although 
research into the Salience explanation has generally conducted preliminary studies, in line with the 
Arousal literature, research has largely failed to conduct any post study corroboration of participant 
interpretations of experimental objects. Due to the problems identified regarding the possible 
inaccurate perception of such object conditions, this may have to some extent prevented clearer 
inferences being drawn in regards to Salient or Arousal object effect’s upon memory recall. Such 
improvements on such limitations within future research, may therefore allow for any differences 
found between Arousal and Salient conditions, to be more confidently attributed as evidence for such 
an explanation of the WFE. 
Additionally, lacking within all of the aforementioned research directly investigating object Salience 
and Arousal explanations of the WFE, is any conclusive measures of physiological arousal, despite 
such being the underlying premise from which the Arousal explanation is based and the Salience 
explanation refuting such a concept to be the driving force behind memory fallibility. Although Loftus 
et al, (1987) provide a likely explanation for the lack of measurement of arousal within past research, 
suggesting the passive nature of laboratory simulations are unlikely to induce arousal or stress levels 
similar to those experienced by real crimes witnesses, the authors also found even when events which 
participants were exposed to were not particularly stressful or arousing, attention narrowing onto 




Consideration has also been paid to psycho-physiologists Klorman et al’s (1977) research which 
suggested that when exposed to threatening or fearful situations such as, a violent crime where a 
weapon is present, the response of an eyewitness is almost always to generate an automatic stress 
response’ or defensive response to such 'stressors’. This defensive response to fearful objects is 
something current day anatomists Tortora and Derrikson (2008) have suggested is characterised by an 
automatic heightening in physiological arousal such as acceleration in heart rate and sweat responses, 
thought to occur as a result of the body seeking to prepare for a state of 'readiness' in response to 
encountering such stressors, known as the 'fight or flight' response.  
If there is something special about emotionally arousing events beyond an objects ‘unusualness’, then 
objects rated as highly arousing but low in salience, would still be expected to produce poorer 
memory recall of peripheral details than neutral control objects, alongside greater increases 
physiological arousal than highly salient and neutral control object conditions.  
Contrastingly, in accordance with the Salience explanation, if a physiologically arousing (threatening 
/ fearful) object that produces a WFE is simply a by-product of its unexpected and unusual presence in 
a given scenario, rather than any fear induced arousal effects, then object’s specifically rated as, high 
in arousal and low in salience, should display very little, if any, deleterious effects upon memory 
recall of peripheral details. Similarly objects rated as, high in salience and low in arousal, should 
display a traditional WFE for such objects, producing poorer recall of peripheral details than all other 
objects. Furthermore in line with Salience explanation’s position, these effects would be expected to 
occur irrespective of any increase in physiological arousal levels experienced in response to highly 
arousing object conditions.  
In the past researchers have seemed to adopt one perspective over the other however, the present 
review seems to suggest that both explanations may in fact be valid. Having said that, recent research 
has favoured the view that object Salience may be a more significant factor in causing the greatest 
deleterious memory effect. On the basis of this reasoning the current study will aim to clearly separate 
the effects of object salience and arousal by use of pre and post questionnaires to identify object 
salience or arousal and show which produces the strongest WFE. In addition, physiological measures 
will also be included to show that the threatening object does cause arousal. This logic leads us to the 
following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Both Salience and Arousing object conditions will produce significantly poorer recall 
accuracy of the video clip target individual than a neutral control condition. However, the salience 
object condition will produce significantly poorer memory recall than the arousing object condition. 
Hypothesis 2- The Arousal object condition will produce significantly greater increases in 







Within the Preliminary study, opportunity sample participants (N=20) recruited from the general 
population, completed a questionnaire. Participants rated an array of objects (selected on the basis of 
usage in past research e.g. Pickel, (1998); Davies et al, (2008)) on a 9 point scale, in terms of how 
Salient (Novel, Interesting or Unusual) and Arousing (Frightening or Threatening) they perceived 
objects to be in the context of a building site. The item rated most Arousing (High Arousal / Low 
Salience) was assigned as representing the stimuli object in the Arousal condition and most Salient 
(High Salience, Low Arousal) was assigned as representing the stimuli object in the Salience 
condition, within the current experiment. The object that was most commonly rated as both low on 




Participants.   Twenty eight British university students (14 Male, 14 Female) aged 20 – 42 years old, 
from an opportunity sample were allocated to one of the three experimental conditions; Arousing 
condition, Salient condition and a control condition, upon arriving on the day. Each condition had a 
roughly equal split of, participants and males / females. No individuals or particular groups of people 
were excluded from participating, only taking note of participant's experiencing heart problems, high 
blood pressure or known memory defects to ensure such factors did not impact experimental results. 
However, no such conditions were known to be present within any of those who took part. The 
participant's who took part in the video clip experimentation study, also took part in the post study 
questionnaire (see Appendix 1.B) however, were independent from those who participated in the 
preliminary study (see Appendix 1.A). 
 
Design. The study adopted an independent measures design. The Independent variable (IV) was the 
variation of film clips observed. The Dependent variable’s (DV) were changes in physiology (Change 
in Galvanic Skin Response – GSR, measured in Micro MHO’s and Change in Heart Rate measured by 
ECG in beats per minute) and Memory scores measuring correct answers out of ten. Based on 
preliminary study findings, objects were assigned to conditions which they were found to accurately 
represent (see Procedure below). The Arousing Condition (High Arousal / Low Salience) was 
assigned the Screwdriver object and the Salience Condition (High Salience, Low Arousal) was 
assigned the Raw Chicken object. A Control Condition used a letter object rated as low in both 
Arousal and Salience. Controls were meticulously undertaken in an attempt to ensure any difference 
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in results could be attributed to differences between the experimental conditions. For example, 
ensuring all aspects of the video clip, conditions and environment where the clips were observed and 
memory scores undertaken were identical between conditions, with the only difference being the 
variation in the object presented in the clip.  
 
Apparatus.    Three video clips were recorded using a digital camera near the grounds of a building 
site which was visible in the background, involving one of three objects (Whole Raw Chicken, 
Screwdriver and Letter) that represented the condition therein. A BIOPAC MP150 system and 
acquisition software along with desktop computers and electrode conductance gel (applied to finger 
tips to monitor pulse), were used to record physiological responses. 
 
Procedure.   Participants were briefed that they were required to watch a short video clip which they 
would later be asked to answer a series of questions about whilst having physiological responses 
(GSR and Heart Rate) measured. Participant's in each condition observed a 60 second video clip 
whereby in the context of a building site where a female is seen to be pursued by a male in workman’s 
clothing, who after gaining her attention and exchanging dialogue (which participants could not hear), 
presents her with one of the aforementioned objects from his bag. The face and appearance of the 
actor holding the object was visible for the same amount of time in each condition. In each of the 
conditions participants were connected up to the physiological recording BIOPAC equipment. 
Participants were given time to relax after which baseline measurements were recorded (60 seconds) 
before experimentation began and were then recorded continuously whilst watching the sixty second 
long clip. To encourage concentration on the clip a blank screen was shown at the start of the video 
stating, “The clip will Begin in 5 Seconds'. 
 
Participants were then disconnected from the BIOPAC apparatus and then without conferring (in 
order to obtain a level of ecological validity to that of real police interview questioning) completed the 
memory questionnaire. The memory questionnaire consisted of ten multiple choice questions 
regarding the appearance of the actor holding the object (see Appendix 1.C), comprising of the correct 
answer, two incorrect answers and ‘Cannot remember’ which participants were encouraged to select 
rather than guess, if the answer was unknown. Finally participants were asked to complete a post 
study questionnaire identical to that used in the preliminary study in order to determine if 
experimental objects were equally interpreted as Arousing and Salient, thereby corroborating 
experimental condition’s representation. 
 
Ethics. All BPS ethical guidelines and procedures were adhered to throughout the duration of 
the research. Partially informed consent was obtained and participants were fully debriefed about the 
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purpose of the experiment after taking part, as well as being provided with contact details in the event 
that any future enquires or issues emerged, including access to counselling services and data 
withdrawal information (see Appendix 1D – 1E). However after the study no participants chose to do 
so. The design of the video clip scenarios also excluded the use of any extremely violent or 
threatening content in an attempt to ensure participants were not harmed or adversely affected by 
























Preliminary Study Questionnaire ¹  
The preliminary study data in Table 1.1 below shows mean differences between Arousal and Salience 
ratings. (Difference / Polarisation score = Arousal score – Salience score, therefore high arousal / 
low salience = a positive (+) score and low arousal / high salience = a negative (-) score).  
The Screwdriver and Whole Raw Chicken objects obtained the greatest mean polarisation scores i.e. 
the bigger the polarisation score, the more arousing and less salient and more salient and less arousing 
the objects were respectively rated as. Both objects also display small standard deviations showing 
most ratings clustered tightly around the mean values. The letter and piece of paper objects can be 
seen to display the smallest mean difference ratings alongside the lowest mean salience and arousal 
ratings. 











Figure 1.2 below shows how the objects with the greatest and smallest mean polarisation scores were 




¹Although likert scales were used, data was assumed to approximate Interval  level (Coolican, 2009). 
 
Stimuli objects N Arousal  scores 
Mean      (SD) 
Salience  scores 




Brick 20 9.1        (1.0) 2.4 (0.9) 6.7 
Screw-driver 20 9.0        (0.8) 2.0          (0.7) 7.0 
Piece of paper 20 1.4        (0.5) 1.6          (0.9) -0.2 
Knife 20 8.8        (1.0) 9.1          (0.9) -0.4 
Letter 20 1.3        (0.5) 1.7          (0.9) -0.4 
Small parcel 20 1.8        (0.8) 1.6          (0.6) -0.2 
Raw Chicken 20 1.1        (0.2) 9.3          (0.8) -8.3 
Toy octopus 20 2.3       (1.1) 9.0          (1.0) -6.7 
Hammer 20 8.1       (1.6) 2.7          (1.6) 5.5 
Banana 20 1.1       (0.3) 3.3          (1.8) -2.2 
Box of 
Chocolates 
20 1.2       (0.7) 5.1          (2.0) -3.9 




Figure 1.2 – Bar chart of Greatest and Smallest mean Polarisation scores 
 
Positively ranked High Arousal / Low Salience Objects 
Shapiro-Wilk normality tests were conducted on the mean positive difference scores (high Arousal, 
low Salience) and mean negative differences scores (high Salience, low Arousal) for both the 
Preliminary and Post study questionnaire comparisons, due to the test being considered to be the most 
reliable normality measure, yielding exact significance values rather than the 0.2 approximation 
occasionally provided by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (Field, 2009).  
Results displayed the majority of scores in all Arousal/ Salience comparisons displayed similar 
significant p-values and therefore all differed significantly from a normal distribution (see Appendix) 
and consequently the same non-parametric tests were also adopted. Despite parametric tests being 
robust enough to withstand moderate violations, when several violations occur in order to confidently 
infer the existence of any effect found the safer option is to conduct a non-parametric equivalent 
(Coolican, 2009). 
A Freidman’s ANOVA was therefore conducted on the High arousal, low salience object polarisation 
scores comparing the mean ranks (see appendix 1.4), displaying a significant difference between 
objects (Chi-Square = 61.71; df = 4; p < 0.001) (see Appendix 1.5). 
A Wilcoxon signed ranks test was conducted in order to compare the differences between arousing 
object polarisation scores, making a “Bonferroni” correction of the significance level in order to 
account for multiple comparisons. The level was set at p = 0.01 in order that comparisons not be too 
stringent as to commit type 2 errors however is conservative enough not to commit type 1 errors either 
























Results showed the screwdriver polarisation score was significantly different from the handgun (Z = -
3.96; N = 20; p < 0.001) and parcel (Z = -3.96; N = 20; p < 0.001) object polarisation scores however 
despite approaching significance there was no significant difference between the screwdriver and the 
hammer (Z = -2.31; N = 20; p = 0.02) and more evidently the screwdriver and the Brick (Z = -0.70; N 
= 20; p = 0.48) polarisation scores (see Appendix 1.6). 
The screwdriver object was found to have the greatest mean polarisation between arousal and salience 
ratings (high arousal / low salience) as well as displaying a significantly greater polarisation score 
than half of the other objects.  
 
Negatively ranked Low Arousal / Highly Salient Objects 
A Freidman’s ANOVA comparing the mean ranks (see Appendix 1.8) of object polarisation scores 
found significant differences occurred between objects (Chi-Square = 99.20; df = 6; p < 0.001) (see 
Appendix 1.9). 
A Wilcoxon signed ranks test found the ‘Chicken’ object to be significantly different from the 
‘Octopus’ (Z = -3.13; N = 20; p < 0.001), ‘Banana’ (Z = -3.95; N = 20; p < 0.001) and ‘Chocolates’ 
(Z = -3.84; N = 2; p < 0.001) polarisation scores (see Appendix 2.0) and therefore feasibly than all 
other lower ranked objects as well. 
The chicken object therefore had the greatest mean polarisation between arousal and salience ratings 
(low arousal / high salience) as well as displaying a significantly greater polarisation score, than all 
other objects. The Raw chicken object therefore best represented the high salience / low arousal 
condition, along with the aforementioned screwdriver object that best represented the high arousal / 
low salience object. The letter object was assigned as the control object due to displaying one of the 
lowest mean polarisation scores and lowest overall ratings in salience and arousal. 
 
Post Study Questionnaire  
The Post study questionnaire data in Table 2.1 below shows mean differences between Arousal and 
Salience ratings.  As with the preliminary study, the Screw-driver and Raw Chicken objects displayed 
the greatest mean polarisation scores. Both objects also display reasonably large standard deviations 
especially the screwdriver object which compared to the preliminary study results, exhibits fairly 
substantial variation around the mean values. The letter object again displayed one the smallest mean 
polarisation scores, alongside low mean salience and arousal ratings of which standard deviations are 
tightly clustered around the mean.  
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Figure 2.2 below shows the objects with the greatest and smallest mean difference scores ratings in 
terms of representing salience and arousal in the context of a building site scenario, in the post 
experimental questionnaire. 
 




Stimuli objects N Arousal  scores 
Mean      (SD) 
Salience  scores 




Brick 30 5.8        (3.1) 3.6 (2.7) 2.2 
Screw-driver 30 6.9        (2.7) 2.8          (1.9) 4.0 
Piece of paper 30 1.2        (0.4) 2.5          (2.5) -1.3 
Knife 30 8.8        (1.2) 7.9          (2.5) 0.9 
Letter 30 1.2        (0.4) 2.3          (2.0) -1.1 
Small parcel 30 2.6        (1.7) 3.0          (2.5) -0.4 
Raw Chicken 30 1.2        (0.6) 8.9          (1.7) -7.8 
Toy octopus 30 1.5       (0.8) 8.0          (2.1) -6.4 
Hammer 30 6.3       (2.8) 2.7          (1.9) 3.7 
Banana 30 1.2       (0.4) 4.9          (2.6) -3.7 
Box of 
Chocolates 
30 1.4       (1.0) 5.3          (2.2) -3.9 

























Positively ranked High Arousal / Low Salience Objects 
A Freidman’s ANOVA comparing mean ranks (see Appendix 2.4) of object polarisation scores found 
significant differences occurred between objects (Chi-Square = 35.14; df = 4; p < 0.001) (see 
Appendix 2.5). 
A Wilcoxon signed ranks test found the ‘Screwdriver’ object to be significantly different from the 
‘Brick’ object polarisation score (Z = -2.68; N = 30; p = 0.01) and therefore feasibly all other lower 
ranked objects as well (Knife and Handgun). There was no significant difference between the 
screwdriver and the hammer polarisation scores (Z = -0.82; N = 30; p = 0.41) (see Appendix 2.6). 
The screwdriver object was found to have the greatest mean polarisation between arousal and salience 
ratings (high arousal / low salience) as well as displaying a significantly greater polarisation score 
than all but one of the other objects. The screwdriver object best represented the high arousal, low 
salience condition and therefore corresponds with findings from the preliminary studies sample 
ratings. 
 
Negatively ranked Low Arousal / Highly Salient Objects 
A Freidman’s ANOVA comparing mean ranks (see Appendix 2.8) of object polarisation scores found 
significant differences occurred between objects (Chi-Square = 114.53; df = 6; p < 0.001) (see 
Appendix 2.9). 
A Wilcoxon signed ranks test found the ‘Chicken’ object to be significantly different from the 
‘Octopus’ (Z = -3.24; N = 30; p < 0.001) and ‘Banana’ (Z = -4.50; N = 30; p < 0.001) polarisation 
scores (see Appendix 3.0) and therefore feasibly than all other lower ranked objects as well. 
The chicken object therefore had the greatest mean polarisation between arousal and salience ratings 
(low arousal / high salience) as well as displaying a significantly greater polarisation score, than all 
other objects. The Raw chicken object was therefore found to best represent the high salience / low 
arousal condition and again the letter object was found to display amongst the lowest mean 
polarisation scores and lowest overall ratings in salience and arousal. 
Therefore results from the preliminary study and post study correspond, both displaying the same 
objects as having the greatest polarisation indicative of high arousal / low salience (screwdriver) and 





Physiological responsiveness and Memory scores of experimental procedure 
 
The statistics in Table 3.1 below show the lowest mean memory scores occurred in the salience 
condition (high salience / low arousal rating) however this was only marginally lower that the arousal 
condition (high arousal / low salience rating). Changes in Physiology displayed mean increases 
occurred in the arousal condition for heart rate however was only marginally greater than that of the 
salience condition. For GSR, mean increases were shown to be greatest in the control condition with 
only slight increases occurring in the arousal condition and decreases occurring in the salient 
condition.  
(Changes in Physiology = difference between three second average of GSR / Heart rate score whilst 
the condition object was presented during each condition and Average Baseline GSR / Heart rate 
measurements during each condition). 
 
Table 3.1- Mean Memory scores and Change in Physiology within conditions 
 
 
Figure 3.2 below shows both experimental conditions exhibited poorer memory recall than control 


































































Figure 3.2 - Line Graph displaying mean memory scores for each condition 
 
Figure 3.3 below displays slight increases in heart rate between baseline and object presentation in 
both experimental conditions with the arousal condition attaining a marginally higher increase than 















Figure 3.4 below displays the arousal condition elicited a marginal increase in GSR in comparison to 
baseline means and the salient condition elicited no increase in GSR instead eliciting a mean decrease 











Figure 3.4 - Line Graph displaying mean changes in GSR for each condition 
 
A Shapiro-Wilk normality test was conducted on the mean change in GSR and mean change in Heart 
rate values within each condition, displaying all conditions had non-significant p-values (see 
Appendix 3.5) and therefore data did not differ significantly from a normal distribution. Within the 
data one slight extreme score was identified however the skew was not considerably large i.e not 
equating twice its standard error therefore was considered to be at an acceptable level (Coolican, 
2010) and was included along with all other data. 
Along with meeting the assumptions that physiological data be interval level and normally distributed, 
an independent sample design requires the homogeneity of variance between the independent groups 
to be equally distributed i.e. non significantly different (Coolican, 2010). A Levene’s equality of 
variance test conducted upon ‘Change in GSR’ and ‘Change in Heart rate’ displayed non-significant 
differences between distributions occurred (p = 0.3 and 0.23) respectively (see Appendix 3.6) and so a 
One way independent groups ANOVA was conducted.  
Results displayed no significant differences between Salience, Arousal or Control conditions were 
obtained within Change in GSR (F = 2.532; df = 2, 25; p = 0.10), Change in Heart Rate (F = 1.364; df 





The aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of object salience and arousal upon 
memory recall and physiological arousal, in an attempt to identify causation of the weapon focus 
effect (WFE), whilst methodologically improving on the experimental procedures adopted within past 
research.  
The results displayed hypothesis 1, that both Salient and Arousing object conditions would produce 
significantly poorer recall accuracy of the video clip target individual than a neutral control condition 
and that the salience object condition would produce significantly poorer memory recall than the 
arousing object condition, was unsupported. Similarly hypothesis 2, that the Arousal object condition 
would produce significantly greater increases in physiological Arousal than Salience object 
conditions, was also unsupported. 
Memory score findings suggested that although both Arousal and Salience object conditions displayed 
poorer memory recall that the neutral control object, with the Salience condition displaying the 
greatest deleterious effect upon recall of the target individual's appearance, as was hypothesised, such 
differences were not found to be significantly different between conditions. Both Salient and Arousal 
conditions thereby failed to produce a significant weapon focus effect upon memory recall.  
Findings also indicated that the Arousal object condition failed to obtain significantly greater changes 
in either heart rate or galvanic skin responses (GSR) than Salient or control conditions, barely even 
obtaining an increase in ‘change in GSR’ whereby the control condition unexpectedly, although only 
moderately to a non-significant level, displayed the greatest such change. Findings from both the 
preliminary and post study questionnaires did however display that ratings of objects assigned to 
represent, high salient / low arousal and high arousal / low salient conditions in the current 
experiment, corresponded between the preliminary and experimental participants. This thereby 
suggests that objects were accurately perceived by the experimental participants as representing the 
conditions to which they had been assigned. Overall despite differences occurring in how participants 
responded to salient and arousing objects, the predicted significant differences between conditions 
were not obtained. 
The current study findings may be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation may be that in 
direct comparison to past research findings that obtained support consistent with the arousal 
explanation (Maass and Kohnken, 1989; Hope and Wright, 2007; Davies et al, 2008) and salience 
explanation (Mitchell et al, 1998; Pickel, 1998; 1999; 2009), when objects were accurately perceived 
by participants as being Salient or Arousing, neither explanation causes a WFE. Alternatively, a 
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seemingly more likely conclusion based upon the consistency with which the WFE has been 
displayed within the past research reviewed, is that the absence of such an effect may have been the 
result of methodological limitations present within the current study.  
 
Methodological Explanations 
One methodological limitation that may have resulted in failure to obtain a significant object effects is 
the small sample size adopted. As was noted by Coolican (2009) failing to obtain significant 
differences between conditions may not necessarily be indicative of no real effect occurring, but 
rather the result of using too few participants which are likely to be unrepresentative of the population 
and allow for sample bias’s to skew data, making any differences between conditions difficult to 
detect. It seems likely then that as only a small number of participants were tested, a type II error may 
have been committed, in that analysis may have failed to accurately demonstrate the genuine effects 
that Salience and Arousal objects had upon memory recall abilities and physiological responses.  
Another such shortfall may have been the passive, detached nature by which participants ‘witnessed’ 
memory, was assessed. Within the current research, to ensure that any effects which occurred in 
salient object or arousing object conditions did not confound with other aspects of the scene, the video 
clip was purposefully kept from looking explicitly like a robbery event (i.e. so that any effects would 
be the result of the arousal or salient objects rather than the threatening nature of the event itself 
causing increased arousal or activation of a robbery schema). Having said this, in doing so as was 
recognised by Loftus et al (1987) and Maass and Kohnken (1989), the level of realism and personal 
involvement experienced from video clip observations may have failed to resemble even modestly, 
that experienced in real crime exposure and therefore as was found in a similar study by Shaw and 
Skolnick (1994), such experiments may not have been immersive enough to allow any arousal or 
salience based weapon focus effects to occur.  
 
Additionally, the short interval in-between participants observing one of the varying video clips 
before answering the memory questionnaire, may have allowed for remembered events to have been 
still ‘fresh’ in their minds and therefore failed to actually account for any deleterious effects per-se. 
Moreover, despite previous research reviewed generally adopting such an immediate memory 
assessment and resultantly obtaining findings consistent with salient or arousing objects producing a 
WFE (e.g. Maass and Kohnken, 1989; Pickel, 1998; Hope and Wright, 2007; Davies et al, 2008), 
some research has quite logically shown that the longer the duration between witnessed events and 





Theoretically, drawing on Atkinson and Shiffrons (1968) Multi-Store model of memory, recent events 
can be held and remembered in what is known as the ‘short-term’ memory store for short time periods 
without actually drawing on memories that have been encoded and retained in the ‘long-term’ 
memory store. As such, the immediacy of the memory recall testing may have reduced or even 
prevented any memory effects associated with object salience or arousal from being accurately 
measured and displayed. 
 
Methodological limitations identified in the present study may therefore account for the failure to 
obtain differences between the effects that Salience and Arousal have upon memory, from being 
clearly identified. Aside from such, also evident is the need for clearer detailed distinction between 
the two major explanations of the WFE, with it seeming fair to assume that such may allow for their 
effects upon memory to be examined in more depth within future research.  
 
Further Theoretical Discussion  
Research reviewed has shown both Arousal and Salience explanations have obtained supportive 
findings consistent with their conceptual underpinnings. Traditionally research supported the Arousal 
perspective, displaying threatening objects to be afforded longer and more frequent eye fixations 
(Loftus et al, 1987) and achieve a greater drain on attention capacity than non-threatening objects 
(Hope and Wright, 2007). However, more recently researchers in the area have tended to favour the 
view that object salience may in fact best account for the WFE, proposing that research findings 
offering support for the Arousal explanation may actually be more indicative of the salient nature that 
such emotionally arousing objects possess. This claim is not without reasoning and is seemingly well 
supported within the recent decade of literature, with research displaying the presence of a weapon to 
impair memory only when objects were deemed, unusual or unexpected in the context that they were 
encountered in (Pickel, 1999) or where such object’s were not in fitting with the beholder’s 
appearance (Pickel, 2009).  
Such findings supporting the salience explanation have led some researchers to refute the premise that 
an increase in arousal brings about the WFE at all, despite acknowledging that exposure to a weapon 
is likely to induce fear and increase physiological arousal (Pickel, 1998; 1999; Mitchell et al, 1998; 
Pickel et al, 2006). However, drawing such a conclusion seems to be a highly speculative claim to 
make simply on the basis of obtaining support for the object salience effect and without detailing why 
such heightened arousal is not considered viable enough to effect memory recall. Although in part this 
may be due to Easterbrook’s (1959) Cue-Utilisation hypothesis and the proponents of the Arousal 
explanation themselves failing to detail exactly why, rather than how, fearful stimuli are thought to 
cause heightened arousal and why such a heightening in arousal levels then causes a weapon object to 
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be focused upon. Nonetheless before such potentially overly simplified conclusions of the WFE can 
be drawn, causation behind the Arousal explanation undoubtedly needs to be examined in more depth, 
something that researchers from both camps have seeming deemed unimportant in the past, simply 
conducting addition research aiming to support or refute the explanation without actually 
investigating why such an effect occurs (e.g. Maass and Kohnken, 1989; Kramer et al, 1990; Mitchell 
et al, 1998; Pickel, 1998, 1999, 2009; Davies et al, 2008).  
One possibility could be that the increased physiological arousal may itself cause the narrowing of 
attention focus away from peripheral details in some way, thereby leading to poorer memory recall of 
particular aspects of an event. However, research examining this concept failed to obtain support, 
instead finding that when physiological arousal levels were elevated through drug stimulation and 
physical exertion, such increases alone were not sufficient enough to produce decreased memory 
abilities consistent with the WFE (Christianson and Mjorndal, 1985; Libkuman et al, 1999).  
Another seemingly more likely interpretation of the Arousal hypothesis comes from Evolutionary 
based Physiological responsiveness. Initially coined by Walter Cannon (1929), emotionally induced 
bodily changes are thought to have evolved in adaptive ways, allowing the body to function in a 
manner that aids survival. Furthermore, an emotional response such as fear, thought likely to occur 
when confronted with threatening stimuli such as a weapon, is said to cause a heightening in 
physiological arousal as a means of preparing the body for any emergency activity required to aid 
survival. This is known as the ‘fight or flight’ response, a largely accepted concept thought to be 
consistently characterised by heightened levels of physiological arousal e.g. increased heart rate, 
sweat response and respiration (Klorman et al,1977; Tortora and Derrikson, 2008).  
This interpretation therefore allows for the Arousal explanation to be laid out with greater clarity, 
explaining focus upon a weapon and the corresponding increase in physiological responsiveness, as 
an adapted method aiding survival, in that central aspects which are the most immediately informative 
in regards to the level of threat posed, are attended to allowing appropriate responses to be selected in 
a timely manner. Consequently, peripheral ‘cues’, less central to aiding the organisms survival, fail to 
obtain the same degree of processing. This interpretation was supported by Loftus and Burns (1982) 
and Valentine and Mesout (2009) by displaying that exposure to high levels of violence, thought to 
induce fear, resulted in poorer memory recall of events, specifically of the ‘perpetrators’ appearance. 
Conducting a deeper examination of the mechanisms underlying the arousal explanation has therefore 
seemingly allowed for support to be provided for the role that arousal has upon the WFE, contrary to 
the aforementioned salience claim. Therefore alongside previously outlined findings supportive of the 




Undoubtedly though, exploration of the Arousal explanation seems to suggest that arousal effects 
upon memory may be more complex than the current Arousal explanation has accounted for. 
Indications from past research point towards emotionally arousing aspects of an event rather those 
non-emotionally arousing per-se, having a significant impact upon memory recall ability. Crucial to 
the understanding of such effects upon memory, may therefore be to distinguish between different 
types of arousal, something which current arousal researchers by enlarge, have failed to consider. 
Deffenbacher et al (2004) whom offered a variation on the arousal explanation contrasting with 
Easterbrook’s (1959) interpretation, which seemingly provides a more detailed and complex but 
nonetheless more complete, account of the arousal influence upon memory.  
Deffenbacher et al, (2004), suggested two varying forms of arousal, one type involved in non-stressful 
emotional events but which draw attention towards a stimulus, known as an ‘orienting response’ and 
an alternative type involved in stressful events, which elicit a ‘defensive response’. The latter 
response corresponds with Cannon’s (1929) aforementioned physiological fight or flight responses to 
fearful stimuli, proposing such is indicative of heighted physiological arousal, alongside cognitive 
anxiety such as fear and is thought to be goal-directed (e.g. to survive). In line with such, whilst 
preparing to respond to imminent threats, memory of peripheral details not being as immediately 
important and required, are impaired. The alternative type of arousal described as an ‘orienting 
response’, differs from the defensive response in that, no actual heightening in physiology within an 
organism is thought to occur, with arousal instead functioning to support alert wakefulness. This 
response serves to aid responsiveness to environmentally different occurrences and allows for 
attention focus to ‘orient’ towards the most informative or interesting aspects of a scene, rather than 
details which are motivationally directed. As such this ‘arousal’ type largely encompasses the 
conceptual underpinnings of the Salience explanation in that, rather than physiological change per-se, 
the arousal of mental or cognitive functioning is thought to result in the processing of certain 
informative aspects whilst less engaging, more expected cues, fail to be encoded. 
Upon outlining the varying types of arousal, which largely encompass characteristics of both salience 
and arousal explanations, Deffenbacher et al (2004) identifies a clear distinction between the two 
explanations of the WFE. Where the current arousal explanation, identical to a ‘defensive response’ is 
characterised by physiological activation from emotionally induced cognitive anxiety, the salience 
explanation, in line with an ‘orienting response’ is said to effect memory recall when informative 
aspects of event are perceived as unexpected or unusual within past schematic memory structures, 
largely if not entirely irrespective of any emotional influence. 
Such a concept corresponds with the assumption that both the salience and arousal explanations may 
independently affect memory recall in a manner consistent with the WFE and clearly distinguishes the 
role of emotionality, linked to cognitive anxiety. Future research could therefore test such a concept 
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by separating the effects of salience and arousal (in a manner consistent with the present study) and 
conducting experimentation in an environment designed to be more physiologically immersive that 
the previous studies, possibly a cinema whereby fearful content might be expected to elicit greater 
physiological responsiveness due to their proposed highly engaging nature of such viewing (Griffiths, 
2008). Subsequently, by also measuring temporal state anxiety, using a scale such as Speilberger’s 
(1983) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (SIAI) and validating the results of such alongside changes in 
physiological responses, if differences in anxiety levels are shown to occur between the two 
explanations but both nonetheless still obtained reduced memory recall of peripheral details, the WFE 
would be clearly displayed to be caused by both explanations, in differing ways. 
Other means of disentangling the effects of object salience and arousal upon the WFE in future 
research could be achieved by measuring the activation of various regions of the brain whilst exposed 
to a fearful or salient stimuli. Research has shown the Amygdala is consistently activated in response 
to encountering emotionally-arousing events (Canli et al, 2000) and specifically fear (LeBar et al, 
1998; Etkin and Egner, 2006). Crucially however, patients with damage to the amygdala, have not 
been shown to have impaired emotional reactions to arousing stimuli, which seeming suggests the 
area may not affect how attention focus is distributed or emotional events are perceived, but rather 
effects how such emotional observations are ‘consolidated’ within memory (Reisberg, 2006). 
Furthermore clear distinctions between regions not associated with emotional responses, such as 
surprise or confusion, in terms of the salience explanation, from that of fear that would allow either 
defensive or orienting responses in presentation of a weapon object to be identified, as of yet are 
seemingly unavailable. 
Overall what can be obtained from such a theoretical review is that on the basis of the salience 
explanation alone, which has shown the WFE to occur as a result of inconsistencies within schematic 
knowledge structures arising, does not imply that the effect cannot occur as a result of emotionally 
linked physiological arousal as well. In order to contribute further to the understanding of both effects 
an important factor allowing such may be that future research adopts measures of state anxiety and 
greater immersive experimental designs as well as brain region activation as developments in neural 
circuitry occur, to provide greater indications of whether both Salience and Arousal explanations do 
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